Tagged: Maldives democracy

May 8, 2015

Bingaa: a case for intellectual leadership on Maldivian affairs

Standoff

As I write, former Maldives National University Chancellor, scholar and 2013 MDP Vice-Presidential candidate Dr Mustafa Lutfi has been arrested following May Day 2015. In his book School Curriculum and Education of Maldives, which is based on his doctoral thesis, Lutfi critiques the various forces that have shaped the country’s education system. It was a book he gifted to Maldives National University Library in 2011. Adding to literature on the Maldives’ recent political history is Aishath Velezinee’s book The Failed Silent Coup: In Defeat They Reached for the Gun. The author offers a first-hand account of (alleged) corruption during her time as a member of the Maldives Judicial Services Commission from 2009 to 2011, circumstances that ultimately led her to become a whistleblower. Velezinee says, like Lufti, she offered to donate her book to the University library. However, her offer was turned down.

The relationship between intellectual activity and democracy ought to be one that enhances the public sphere. But how can scholarship contribute to this goal and flourish in a social and political environment that discourages rigorous, informed debate? In this essay I explore the idea that deficient or suppressed intellectual activity diminishes the quality of democracy; and, that a lack of critical inquiry equates to increased mobility for state operators when their policies are unchecked by engaged analytical minds. Although not exhaustive, I convey a literature review of scholarly and non-scholarly articles to articulate potential future directions for research on the political history of the Maldives. Peer-reviewed research is severely lacking in this area. Yet scholarship offers significant potential in terms of unpacking the consequences of political authority and informing responses to it.

Media narrative & international representations of the Maldives

Media have attempted to fill the knowledge gap vacated by scholarship. The narrative adopted by international media about the policies and practices of the second Gayoom regime (2013-today) is typically twofold. The first is captured in the depiction of the regime offered by Amal Clooney who, writing in The Guardian, opens with: “It may be famous for the pristine holiday beaches of its Indian Ocean coastline but the Maldives has taken a dark authoritarian turn.” The bundled imagery channels international readers’ existing knowledge of global tourist branding, suggesting simply: yesterday the Maldives was pristine, peaceful and sunny; today it is dark, evil and despotic.

The media narrative then tends to depict outrage at this “turn” and portrays the Maldives as democratically deficient. As Jose Ramos-Horta and Benedict Rogers’ write in The Guardian in relation to Nasheed’s sentencing: “On Friday night the final nails were hammered into the coffin of democracy in the Maldives.” It is thus not surprising that for many commentators the recent history of the tropical island state symbolizes a betrayal of values regarded by the international community to be inviolable such as democracy, transparency and human rights. In media discourse the country is also increasingly associated with a lack of press freedom and as a recruiting ground for Islamic State militants. These factors lend to a growing perception that the Maldives is tinkering on being a failed state and lend weight to advisory warnings to foreign tourists.

To draw on a local phrase, the bingaa (Dhivehi for ‘foundation slate’) of the ruling regime appears in international media coverage to comprise force, fear, money, intrigue, hard-line hostility to the opinions of foreign dignitaries, and a militaristic defense of sovereignty in place of heeding international condemnation of judicial and other shortcomings in due process. On this point it is worth mentioning how another media text – The Island President – may have contributed to these portrayals as a mode of “backgrounding”. Responding in The Guardian to the incarceration of former Maldives President Mohamed Nasheed, his lawyer Amal Clooney refers to The Island President, which introduces viewers to some crucial political history regarding the first Gayoom regime (1978-2008). Clooney says Nasheed’s “remarkable story is chronicled in the acclaimed documentary”.

However, as an explanation of Nasheed’s imprisonment for 13 years on “terrorism” charges in the current political climate, his legal case needs to be put into greater context. As a case study, scholars are yet to unpack the internationally acclaimed film as a media/discursive text, the geo-political circumstances in which its subjects gained international notoriety, its success as a vehicle for the reproduction of ideologies and beliefs, and the extent to which it has shaped diplomatic and other commentators’ views on the subject of Maldivian politics.

Knowledge capacities & organization of the state

Grievances highlighted by both last week’s May Day protests and Nasheed’s imprisonment have revealed the need for greater understandings of the strategic, discursive and institutionalized hold on political power by the second Gayoom presidential regime. Ideally this would begin with an exploration of similar processes pertaining to the first Gayoom presidential regime and through identifying continuities and departures in each of these approaches to government. Moreover, through rigorous research and critique scholars can identify processes delivering opportunities including “Corruption, closed-door decisions, ‘jobs-for-the-boys’, pork-barrelling, being ignored by your [elected representatives], and, among other scurvy possibilities, shifting the fruits of the many to the few.”

The political currency of unchallenged historical knowledge concerning Maldivian statehood is significant. To exemplify these implications, the gap in scrutiny has had measurable impacts on the conduct of political life, embodied in the unqualified privilege – by international standards, that is – acquired by the three Criminal Court judges who heard Nasheed’s terrorism trial. None of the judges have law degrees. This deficiency has a functional role for the second Gayoom regime whose uncompromising policy platform requires generating electoral buy-in for reviving a quasi patron-client system that casts privilege on supporters, power to the wealthy and exile to detractors.

We can see how the function of knowledge deficiency plays out in the regime’s politicking; last week Maldives Foreign Minister Dunya Maumoon described the Presidency of Nasheed as “the single most brutal, dictatorial and violent period of rule in contemporary Maldivian history.” Being up close and personal to the subject matter her entire life – as daughter of 30-year autocratic ruler Maumoon Gayoom – Dunya’s grasp on Maldivian history may be, in her perspective, correct. And therein lies the problem. The role of scholars here is to critique her objectivity and assess the propaganda value of these statements. Moreover, any claims democratic governments make about history requires inquisitive dissection and fact-checking.

The myths, linguistic capital and political folklore surrounding political elites requires critical analysis and contextualisation. This includes unpacking how myth, image and symbols lend to cultivating power as well as popular tropes concerning the leaders themselves – take, for instance, the implications of networked information flows viz-a-viz ‘Anni’s lucky number’ (being 4) for the democracy movement, or why the Progressive Party of the Maldives chose the colour pink (some say because of the national pink rose). Furthermore this includes analysing literary overtures accompanying the first Gayoom regime such as Royston Ellis’ A Man for All Islands: A Biography of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. There are also two self-authored books by Maumoon Gayoom, The Maldives: A Nation in Peril (1998) and Paradise Drowning (2008) – both showcasing the former president’s orations on environmental challenges facing the Maldives.

Interestingly, while scholarly contributions to public debate are limited, intellectuals have been mobilized within the bureaucratic power structure of the Maldives under the current government. One outcome of the 2013 elections that delivered Yameen Abdul Gayoom the presidency is the delegation of Ministries to at least four highly educated political actors whose names are preceded by the title ‘Dr’. Critics suggest these appointments lend an air of prestige and respectability to a government losing the ideas contest. It may also capture a lingering deference to formality and titles within the Maldives’ political hierarchy, which is as much a cultural as it is an historical phenomenon. Collectively these Ministers have doctoral expertise in marine offshore aquiculture, civil engineering, and sharia law. My own consultations revealed that greater expertise is sought in foreign affairs, legal and judicial matters, public service, public policy, transparency, public health, communications, media and advocacy.

Intellectual vanguard

Without more methodical critique of the past, Maldivian democracy will continue to endure a wilderness of intrigue. Maldivians have expressed desires for greater knowledge about their country’s politics, parties and leaders. Many stated they want the country to have a firmer grip on its dealings with the international community, especially “big” countries like India, the US and China. Questions concerning the lack of knowledge and political biography are entwined with global trends and the necessity to respond to international actors. Knowing more about topics like foreign policy and what makes good public policy is about making an investment into national development, regional stability and social cohesiveness.

All but a handful of related and semi-related studies explore the politics of tourism (the Maldives’ “golden goose”), international relations, regional security strategy, legal interpretations of Maldivian politics, and the implications of economic transition and sustainability for the country. A proactive intellectual vanguard is crucial as much for consensus building as it is to initiating change. The importance of intellectuals as contributors to political change is emphasized in Gramsci’s efforts to accentuate the centrality of the “war of position” (the contest of ideas, values, the cultivation of collective memory and the formation of an “historic bloc”), to be waged in conjunction with a “war of maneuver” (waged through force and economic means). (Gramsci of course was referring to “organic intellectuals” – producers of knowledge articulating a cause from within – but I’ll leave that for another time.)

Yet there remain few peer-reviewed accounts of the contemporary political history of the Maldives and crucially histories ‘from below’ incorporating the impacts of civil society, institutions, cultural life and religion on democracy. One exception is the ongoing series of critical essays published via Dhivehisitee: Life and Times of Radicalisation & Regression Maldives authored mainly by Maldivian Dr Azra Naseem, who, while publishing in a non-academic outlet, is among the most critically engaged with the subject matter. Furthermore, Maldivian scholar Dr Athualla Rasheed has written several academic journal articles, but only with noticeable caution does he define President Nasheed’s resignation/ousting as the ‘pre and post–coup periods’.

And it is a hesitance worth unpacking. President Nasheed stepped down from power in February 2012 following what international commentators, like Clooney, have labeled a “coup” at military gunpoint. By contrast Nasheed’s successor and political opponents have defined this episode in smoother terms as a legal “transfer of power”, a position supported by the Commonwealth-backed Commission of National Inquiry (CoNI). Despite this, evidenced by public discourse is that continuing tension over how to define this moment lays at the heart of the struggle for democratic reform in the Maldives today. For Maldivian analysts, permitting ambiguity to define this moment is understandable and symptomatic of the pressures faced by autocratic subjects to refrain from ‘rocking the boat’.

By contrast international scholarly commentators have been at liberty to describe the event as a coup in solidarity with Maldivian democracy activists. For instance, in their essay on Dhivehisitee, Professor John Foran and PhD researcher Summer Gray (September 2013) issue little restraint utilizing the term “coup”. They support this view in Counterpunch, stating: “Two independent legal evaluations of the CoNI Report both unequivocally found the Report deficient”. Notwithstanding their extensive citation of supporting empirical materials, there is significant room to get the ball rolling towards producing some foundational peer-reviewed analysis on the subject matter.

Harnessing future knowledges

Through knowledge creation, research and a commitment to learning commentators may draw firmer conclusions about the history, and perhaps the future, of Maldivian democracy. This is particularly with regards to the various ways in which – as many commentators suggest – the second Gayoom regime has consolidated power, limited dissent, stacked the judiciary, maintained a contested human rights record, goaded opposition supporters into violent confrontations and mobilized security forces in response to May Day protests.

Enter: J.J. Robinson’s forthcoming book The Maldives: Islamic Republic, Tropical Autocracy (to be released in October in the UK and November in the US) which observes the thrusts of Maldivian democracy from the author’s perspective as former editor of Minivan News. Robinson describes the book as “a journalistic account of the Maldivian democracy experiment” with a particular focus on the role of judiciary, and makes the case that “the unconstitutional reappointment of Gayoom’s pet judiciary in August 2010 was the thing that really scuttled any hope of a stable democratic outcome.” Robinson’s account is to be the first ‘embedded’ narration of political change in contemporary Maldives (that is, at least by a non-national).

This contribution to public knowledge is set to be powerful, up close and engaging, and an example of why more of analytical knowledge is needed regarding the political history of the Maldives. Critique, ideas, knowledge creation, debate and intellectual leadership are vital for informing political change in the Maldives as well as international responses to the country’s looming political crisis.

While international media, the US, EU and India continue to convey outrage at the re-emergence of autocratic tendencies in the Maldives, little if anything is being delivered by the international community in terms of investments into capacity building intellectual culture and leadership. This is a shortcoming of international aid programs despite some countries like Australia facilitating education sector improvements since the days of the Nasheed administration.

Meanwhile, Velezinee, who began her PhD candidature at Erasmus University in 2015, says she hopes the Maldives “moves towards scholarly debates with a view to establishing the rule of law and a democratic culture.” The difficulty, she points out, is that “the subject matter means it is taboo for any public institution in the Maldives to be viewed implicitly or explicitly to act as a conduit towards learning about these events in any way, shape or form.” Velezinee adds: “Currently, all debate is left to politics and politicians, and the only ‘scholars’ engaging appear to be religious scholars with their own interests. We have to change the language of political debates.”

Optimistically, Maldivian researchers are dispersed all over the world. Away from home they are slowly beginning to piece together their political history. Perhaps the time has come to harness this network and undertake a more proactive dialogue between scholars interested in developing a political biography of the Maldives.

Non-peer reviewed academic resources of note

Colton, Elizabeth, ‘The Elite of the Maldives: Sociopolitical Organisation and Change’ (PhD Thesis), London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, 1995. URL: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1396/

Jorys, Shirley, ‘Muslim by Law – A Right of a Violation of Rights? A Study About the Maldives’ (Thesis), 2005. URL: http://ebookbrowse.com/shirley-jorys-dissertation-muslim-by-law-pdf-d214056909

Mohamed, Mizna, ‘Changing reef values: an inquiry into the use, management and governances of reef resources in island communities of the Maldives’ (PhD Thesis), University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, October 2012.

Zahir, Azim, ‘Islam and Democracy: The Maldives Case Study’ (Masters Thesis), Master of Human Rights, University of Sydney, 2011.

Dr Robert Carr produced the Maldives National University Political Science Curriculum. He is a researcher at University of Western Sydney. Tweet: @robcarr09

Photo of standoff between pro-democracy supporters and the Maldives Police Service on 1 May, by Dhahau Naseem

September 26, 2014

THE POLITICS OF RILWAN’S DISAPPEARANCE: GANGS, CRIME, POLITICIANS & LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE MALDIVES

by Aishath Velezinee

A private investigation by Glasgow-based Athena Intelligence and Security into the disappearance of Rilwan (aka Rizwan, @moyameehaa), a Maldivian journalist missing since August 8, 2014, has not led people any closer to finding him nor has it firmly established how he disappeared. Instead, the PI report has opened up the politics of Rilwan’s disappearance.

Today, the interwoven complexities of gangs, religious extremism, politics and organised crime—and the incapacity of law enforcement to address these issues—cannot be ignored. Reaction of politicians, gangs and the Maldives Police Services (MPS) to the Private Invesitgator’s report—commissioned by the Maldivian Democracy Network (MDN) and released on Monday—emphasise these issues. It is starkly obvious in the long-drawn unproductive “search for Rilwan” by the MPS, as much as in their reluctance to speak with or meet the press.

The Private Investigation

The PI report, in fact, has very little new information to disclose. From CCTV footage where Rilwan is last spotted and material already in public domain, the PI identified Ahmed Shiran Saeed and another unnamed man, both said to belong to Kuda Henveiru gang as suspects in Rilwan’s disappearance. Video showing “evidence of possible hostile surveillance being undertaken by two known gang members” is cited as evidence.

Ibrahim Firaq and Aalif Raoof (Arliph Rauf) are named as owners of the only two cars registered in the Maldives that fits the description of a car involved in an abduction that reportedly took place outside Rilwan’s residence at the approximated time of his disappearance. MPS had earlier revealed that two cars had been brought under police custody in relation to Rilwan’s disappearance, but later denied Rilwan was the victim of abduction. There is no report of any other person who disappeared without trace at the time or on the date of Rilwan’s disappearance. So far MPS has not provided the identity of the victim of abduction.

A fifth man named in the report is Ismail Abdul Raheem, a known extremist previously involved in religiously-motivated violent attacks, who had reportedly stalked Rilwan earlier. No direct connection to Rilwan’s disappearance is noted.

The report draws no conclusions except for ruling out suicide or voluntary disappearance. On motives, too, the report has no conclusive information, and considers the possible involvement of major criminal gangs, politicians and religious extremists, referring to available information and past activities.

Three gangs, Buru, “Bosnia”, and Kuda Henveiru are named as possible sources to follow-up. The report cites a series of recent “abductions” of the administrators of a Facebook group called “Colourless”. These cases were not reported to MPS by the victims though they have shared their experience on being invited to speak. They were harassed, intimidated and at least one was physically man-handled by gangsters and religious extremists working together. The alleged gang leader, Muaz, has not denied being involved, in fact he justified his action to his comrades as a “deserved shaking up”.

Possible link to powerful politicians, including government ministers, who reportedly support and use radicalised gangs for personal and political ends is reported as having been brought up by a number of sources. Tourism Minister Ahmed Adeeb, and Defence Minister Mohamed Nazim are named as influential and corrupt politicians, and the name of former Deputy Speaker Ahmed Nazim comes up as having possibly attempted “to draw political capital” from Rilwan’s disappearance:

Following the Subject’s disappearance, in August 2014, it was reported that Ahmed NAZIM, the former Deputy Speaker contacted this reporter and informed him that the Subject had been working on a story to expose the TM [Tourism Minister Adeeb], for corrupt activity. It was suggested that if Haseen were able to link the Subject’s disappearance with the TM, NAZIM would provide him with evidence of the TM’s corruption.

NazimAdeeb The public alliance of Defence Minister Mohamed Nazim and Tourism Minister Ahmed Adeeb and their shared antagonism of Home Minister Umar Naseer is also noted. Further, Islamic Minister Mohamed Shaheem and Home Minister Umar Naseer are named as having met gang members led by Muaz Hammer aka Gut Mua who is said to have initiated the meetings to discuss their concern “on the growth of secularsm” in the Maldives.

MinisterMeet1 The so-called religiously motivated “abductions” of the “Colourless” administrators took place after these meetings which were reported by the Government as “concerned youth” having met the ministers.

MinisterMeet2

The PI report notes they had no access to forensic evidence, and is predominantly based on information from unnamed witnesses and stakeholders gathered from field research using the snowball approach and the cross referencing of these. The purpose of the report, as stated, is “to balance theory and conjecture with fact”.

The Ongoing Search for Rilwan by MPS

The last update from MPS on the investigation into Rilwan’s disappearance on September 16, 2014, translated into English by MPS, reported:

The investigation has determined that no one saw Rizwan in Hulhumale’ after 0000 hours on the 7th of August 2014 and that he did not speak to anyone either.
CCTV footage shows him entering the Hulhumale’ Ferry Terminal in Male’ at about 0055 hours on the 8th of August and an individual told the Police that they spoke to him while on the ferry.
The Police have not found any conclusive evidence linking Rizwan’s disappearance to the incident which occurred near his home on the night of the 7th and the fire in Hulhumale’, which took place on the 15th of August has not been linked to the case either.
Additionally, the Police have summoned and interviewed other individuals caught on the CCTV footage of Rizwan that night.
About 1235 hours of footage from 157 cameras from 79 locations have been obtained and is being analyzed and the footage points to him last being seen at 0055 hours on the 8th of August at the Hulhumale’ Ferry Terminal.
Additionally, 521 minutes of dives have been conducted and a total area of 267197.5 square kilometers have been searched under water, along with 84 vessels.
9 places of residence in Male’ have been searched and about 139 locations in Hulhumale’, including places of residence, warehouses and garages, have been searched.
Some guest houses in the islands are also being searched.
A total of 128 individuals have been questioned and had their statements taken while 387 individuals were questioned and had information recorded, along with 192 individuals who lived in 77 apartments in Hulhumale’.

Earlier, on September 4, 2014, MPS had revealed two cars were being held with Court Orders in case of disappeared journalist and forensic samples were to be sent abroad for testing; and that passports of four individuals were being held.

MPS reaction to the PI report

On Tuesday evening, MPS reacted strongly to the PI report with a loaded and highly political 13-paragraph press release. The Police statement declared MDN had acted irresponsibly, with intent to mislead the public and to achieve a specific political purpose. It went on to say MDN had committed a “lowly act” with the purpose of defaming certain politicians, and that it intended to shape public opinion a certain way. It also said MPS had formed a special task force and was investigating Rilwan’s disappearance.

The statement condemned MDN revealing the identity of suspects saying MDN had violated the human rights of the said individuals, diminishing their human dignity, creating public hatred against them and putting their safety at risk. MPS also noted that the said individual had “already lodged a complaint asserting MDN release of their personal information had put them in danger”.

It further stated that MPS had noted “some parties are attempting to gather information on the ongoing investigation of MPS through Rilwan’s family and others”, and went on to declare that MPS did not believe that the PI’s work, carried out “in the name of searching for Rilwan” with the backing of some persons, was a legitimate activity. It also declared that the MPS will investigate the investigation, and take necessary action against “those behind” the PI report.

MPS also noted they are professionally trained in advanced countries, naming United States, United Kingdom and Australia, and asserted that they follow international best practice in all investigations and are proficient in investigating crimes ranging from petty crimes to terrorism.

RilwanMarch Last Sunday, following MDN’s announcement of the pending release of the PI’s findings, Commissioner of Police Hussain Waheed—who at the time was visiting Haa Dhaal Atoll with all the pomp of a politician—appeared to be reacting strongly against the #FindMoyameehaa movement led by friends and family of Rilwan.

HusseinWaheedDo Addressing the community, CP Hussain Waheed criticized the public demanding action from Police and is quoted as saying “MPS will not be swayed by people’s demands” and “MPS must not be infenced by any person or a group of persons”. Indirecty he referred to a public rally, #SuvaaluMarch (or Question March), led by family and friends of Rilwan demanding answers to questions related to the police investigation into the disappearance of Rilwan. Opposition leader, former President Mohamed Nasheed, and some senior politicians of Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) had joined the rally to which family of Rilwan had personally written and invited all major parties to join.

MPS response to President Nasheed’s interview to The Independent (UK) was similar, where instead of being concerned and attempting to investigate MPS chose to categorically deny Nasheed’s claim of extremism in the security force in a press release on September 18, 2014. The statement went on to appeal to Nasheed not to defame the security forces “for popularity or public support”.

Reactions to PI Report

NihanTweet1 Following the release of the PI report, the parliamentary majority leader, MP Ahmed Nihan of the ruling Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM), publicly ridiculed the #FindMoyameehaa effort with a tweet mocking the attempts to find him and belittling Rilwan’s disappearance. He then went on to shamelessly defend his action despite the wording on the poster he tweeted which contradict his claim it was an innocent act, and argued: “Parliament have done its part by probing the matter through its proper channels. 241 Committee deliberated.” Online supporters of PPM carried the same line, mocking and taunting those concerned about Rilwan’s disappearance.

Haam

In fact, the parliamentary 241-Committee mandated to look into national security services, a permanently closed committee without access to media or public is reported to have passed the case of Rilwan’s disappearance, raised by the opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP), to a sub-committee. The sub-committee has issued no reports and the 241-Committee has not convened since.

Overnight, new twitter accounts sprung up to harass those who speak up to find Rilwan. This is in addition to the regular supporters of government online who continue to see Rilwan’s disappearance a laugh.

President Yameen Abdul Gayoom who has previously refused to comment on Rilwan’s disappearance remained silent, as did the Home Minister Umar Naseer who was outspoken on gangs, drugs and serious crime and their connection to President Yameen in the lead up to 2013 elections. Nasheed, meanwhile, accused leaders of Adhaalath Party, Islamic Minister Mohamed Shaheem and Sheikh Imran of radicalizing youth and promoting extremism through indoctrination and encouragement of vigilante action in the name of Islam. Nasheed went on to claim Rilwan is believed to have been abducted by a radicalised youth.

“Don’t do this to our youth. Don’t make them do all these vile deeds after picking them out individually and leading them astray,” the opposition leader appealed at an MDP rally in Male’ coinciding with the release of the PI report after the scheduled open air rally had been postponed twice due to bad weather.

MDP MP Eva Abdulla who spoke of Rilwan’s disappearance at the same rally received a text message after the event threatening a suicide attack during the next MDP gathering; and vowing to “kill off” MDP members and to fight “to the last drop of blood.”

Meanwhile, Executive Director of MDN, Shahindha Ismail and lawyer of Rilwan’s family Mushfique Mohamed are openly receiving threats, and it requires huge imagination to envision MPS acting on these threats to guarantee the safety of their targets. “Aleef Thuththu Ec”, seen in the photo below asking for information on Shahindha and Mushfique saying “they need to be disappeared”, is said to be a brother of the Aalif named in the PI report as registered owner of one of the red cars.

AleeThutthu AleeThutthu 2

Gangs, Politicians and Law Enforcement

A rapid assessment of gangs in Male’, published by Asia Foundation in 2012, estimates between 20 and 30 different gangs are active in Male’, an island barely 2.5sq.km in total land area, surrounded by the ocean. It is estimated that there are 50 to 400 members in each of these gangs.

Income for many of these gangs are said to come from “exchanges with political actors or business people.” The report found payment is usually in the form of money, but that sometimes alcohol would be provided for gang services such as participation in political protests, starting political riots, destroying property or injuring a third party. “Money is often given to a gang to initiate a fight so as to divert attention from a political issue”, the report states. Politicians or businessmen generally only deal directly with the gang leader and the amount of money exchanged is known only to the gang leader. The member who carries out the contract receives a small portion of the money. Leaders can sometimes get a monthly income of up to MRF 1 million (USD 65,000) for being on call to carry out a politicians ‘dirty work.’ In extreme cases gang members are given contracts to carry out murder. One member said, “We may be given a file with all the information about the person and be told we may be paid in millions to carry out the killing.” ~ Rapid Assessment of Gangs in Male’, 2012.

The report found gang members had protectors or patrons among powerful politicians who guaranteed law enforcement agencies will leave them alone and that they would be saved from Courts where necessary. A co-dependency is said to exist as gang leaders are aware of illegal and criminal activities of politicians and each depend on the other to achieve their ends.

Serious Concerns

The PI report, the updates provided by MPS on the “ongoing search for Rilwan” and the language and sentiments expressed in other related statements of MPS, and the indisputable fact that it is now nearly 50 days since Rilwan disappeared, gives serious reason for concern about the police investigation. Of immediate critical concern is the unknown situation of Rilwan as the reported “search” by MPS continues without any visibility of such an activity or meaningful updates.

Rilwan’s disappearance, the circumstances surrounding it, the researched yet never addressed relationship between gangs, politicians and crime, and the influence of politics and politicians on law enforcement inclusive of police and the judiciary, makes the situation in Maldives today terrifying. Worse is there is no functional mechanism within the State to stand up to these issues and say, enough is enough.

HusseinWaheedTweet

Current Commissioner of Police in 2013 had tweeted, ‘Police forms a Gang Task Force to prevent and eradicate violent criminal activity. Zero tolerance for gang activity!” but gang crime and the brutality of violent crimes has risen sharply, with stabbings and murders common. Rilwan’s abduction, a crime like no other before this, may not be the last given the criminal environment and the fact that perpetrators of serious crime rarely face justice.

Despite the statements of MPS to the contrary, serious crimes have sharply risen with 31 murders recorded since 2001, ten murders 2012 alone which include the brutal torture and murder of lawyer Ahmed Najeeb and the violent hacking of MP Dr. Afraasheem Ali. A record 27 of these 31 murders remain unsolved.

Crime statistics available on MPS website show crime had been steadily on the rise since 2000, and had decreased by as much as 12% in 2010, rising again 5% in 2011 and 15% in 2012.

Not least among concerns is that MPS may be unable, or unwilling, to investigate Rilwan’s disappearance or address serious organized crime. It may indeed be politics, and the involvement of powerful individuals within or with links to Government is preventing MPS from being professional. Just as gang leaders depend on influential politicians, senior law enforcement officials too depend on powerful individual politicians upon whom their livelihoods depend. When crime rules and silence pays, few would be willing to break out and put their lives and livelihood at risk. They are the fools.

HusseinWaheed2

August 22, 2013

Revisiting the process of democratisation and sustaining democracy in Maldives

by Ahmed Hamdhan

The first multiparty Presidential election of 2008 in Maldives saw an end to the 30-year dictatorship of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom and the adoption of a modern democracy for the first time in the Maldives. Nevertheless, as in many other nascent democracies, there is real doubt whether Maldives can sustain its democracy in its fullest sense, especially after the recent coup that ousted the first democratically elected president in February 2012.

Some scholars argue that the mode of democratic transition a country experiences proves to be a critical factor in determining the country’s democratic future [1]. Hence, an analysis of the mode of democratic transition that occurred in Maldives may help in predicting whether democracy could be sustained in future. Political scientist Samuel Huntington argues that the process of democratisation could be determined based on ‘the relative importance of governing and the opposition groups as the sources of democratisation’ [2]. He identifies three broader modes of democratisation; (1) ‘transformation’ (from above) occurs when the regime itself takes initiative in bringing democracy; (2) ‘replacement’ (from below) occurs when opposition groups take the initiative and replace the regime by bringing democracy; and (3) ‘transplacement’ (through bargain) occurs when both government and opposition work together to bring about democracy.

My aim here is to analyse the process of democratisation in Maldives in terms of the theories offered by Huntington, and identify the modes of democratic transition that occurred in Maldives. This in turn may help predict the future sustenance of democracy in Maldives. This essay argues that no one particular mode of democratisation occurred in Maldives as none of them materialised fully. However, various efforts from the current opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) together with the leadership of Mohamed Nasheed have contributed significantly to the process and facilitated negotiations with the regime leading to democratisation. To achieve the stated-aim, I will discuss the major events that contributed to the democratisation process in Maldives by relating them to the modes of transition outlined above.

The initial period of democratic struggle – a period of near ‘replacement’

The initial period of the struggle for democracy in Maldives depicts characteristics of ‘replacement’ where citizens started to challenge the regime through various means and made attempts to overthrow the autocratic government. The first serious challenge to dictator Gayoom was in 1988, with a failed coup attempt carried out by Sri Lankan Tamil mercenaries financed by wealthy Maldivians. A year after the attempted coup, the election of western-educated young politicians to the parliament in 1989 resulted in increased pressure for democratic reforms. However, many of them and their family members faced significant threats from the regime and some of them were imprisoned for various politically motivated charges [3]. The regime continued to suppress major opposition figures through arbitrary arrests. In 2001, Mohamed Nasheed – both a Member of Parliament and a major opposition figure – was arrested and imprisoned for two and half years. The same year, the opposition MDP made their first attempt to formally register themselves as a political party. The Home Ministry, mandated to register civic organisations, sent the petition to parliament where it was overwhelmingly rejected.

On September 20, 2003, civil unrest broke out in the capital Male’ sparked by the death of prison inmate Hassan Evan Naseem. Evan was tortured to death by security forces during an interrogation. News of his death led to riots in the prison and a subsequent shootout by the police that killed three more inmates and injured many others. The news spread throughout Maldives, becoming the major trigger for many to publicly demand democratic reforms.

Since the September unrests, Gayoom came under tremendous pressure from both domestic and international actors that compelled him to announce democratic reforms. On June 2004, during an informal meeting, Gayoom announced his proposed changes to the Constitution including two term limits for President, direct election of President, measures to increase separation of powers and removing the gender bar for political participation. Moreover, he urged citizens to debate publicly his proposals. The opposition were still very sceptical about Gayoom’s real intentions and raised doubts whether he could bring about concrete reforms.

However, the reform announcement itself facilitated the opposition to organise more activities publicly. Matt Mulberry from the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, argues that the reforms announced by Gayoom ‘technically gave citizens freedom of speech and freedom of assembly’. As a result, some citizens organised a series of “minivan debates” (‘minivan’ means ‘independent’ in Dhivehi) where they discussed the political issues facing the country. Unsurprisingly, the government sent police to disrupt these debates, eventually declaring them illegal.

Despite these repressive actions, the opposition organised a huge protest on August 12-13, 2004 to mark the death of Evan Naseem and demanded reforms, including the release of political prisoners. A record number of citizens took part in the protest which became the largest political gathering ever in the history of Maldives at that time [4]. The crackdown that followed the protest led to the arrest of hundreds of activists and injured many protesters. As a result, violence erupted in capital Male’ and other parts of the country. Despite the oppressed media, news of the regime’s repressive actions attracted the attention of many international actors. By then, President Gayoom faced immense pressure from the UK, US, India and Sri Lanka to bring about political reforms.

From ‘replacement’ to ‘transplacement’ – a period of joint action

The mounting international pressure and political instability in Maldives led to a new phase in the democratisation process as the regime agreed to have serious negotiations with the opposition. The willingness of joint action from both the regime and the opposition led to a period of ‘transplacement’ in the democratisation process. The regime agreed to sit with the opposition for the first time in the UK. During the negotiations, the regime agreed to more reforms including formation of independent oversight bodies such as the Police Integrity Commission and the Judicial Services Commission. Moreover, informal talks between reformers within the regime and the opposition were held in Sri Lanka facilitated by the British High Commissioner. However, the lack of true commitments from the regime led the opposition to realise that international pressure alone would not help bring down the autocratic leadership. Hence, they increased their efforts in organising more protests, speeches and sit-ins. As a result of the mounting support for the opposition’s cause, reformers within the government increased their efforts in pressuring Gayoom to implement urgent reforms.

The pressure from few reformers within the government and the opposition MDP led to a period of ‘transformation’ where the regime was compelled to take reform actions. In April 2005, the then Attorney General Dr Hassan Saeed overturned his predecessor’s decision by issuing a formal legal opinion to allow the registration of political parties. In June 2005, the parliament unanimously voted in favour of a resolution to allow multi-party democracy for the first time in Maldives. The Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) – the main opposition party – led by Mohamed Nasheed was formally registered, along with several other political parties representing different views. In March 2006, the regime published a Roadmap that ‘included 31 proposals for revision of the Constitution, a series of time-bound commitments on human rights, and proposals to build institutions and mobilise civil society’ [5]. However, many still doubted whether the regime was committed to real reforms. Ahmed Shaheed (then Foreign Minister) later argued that, through the reform agenda, Gayoom was seeking to get rehabilitated and thereby stabilise his presidency [6]. He argued that by 2007, Gayoom had achieved his aim by gaining widespread domestic support and getting rehabilitated.

However, new cracks that significantly weakened the regime emerged as those most closely associated with the reform agenda left the government. On 5^th August 2007, both Dr Hassan Saeed and Mohamed Jameel (Justice Minister) resigned from their posts. They claimed that working outside Gayoom’s regime was the only option to advance their reform agenda. Later on the same month, Ahmed Shaheed resigned from the post of Foreign Minister accusing the government of stalling democratic reforms. These developments saw more public support for the opposition reform movement. After several disagreements with the Special Majlis (Special Parliament), Gayoom ratified the new Constitution in August 2008, allowing key democratic reforms and paving way for the first multi-party presidential election in October that year.

As evident from the discussion above, three modes of democratisation have contributed to the democratisation process in Maldives, though characteristics of ‘transformation’ are very little. Interestingly, there appears to be a correlation between each mode as the occurrence of one type led to the other. This observation therefore contradicts Huntington’s view that the three modes of democratisation are alternatives to one another.

However, it is important to note the significant role played by the opposition MDP, especially Mohamed Nasheed as the leader who never took a step back in his quest to bring democracy to Maldives. It is clear that MDP played the most critical role in the process of democratisation. I have previously argued that Gayoom is the major obstacle to sustaining democracy and the threat is heightened more than ever with his current political activeness. Reflecting on the process of democratisation and the strong influence of Gayoom on many institutions till today, I still doubt sustenance of democracy in the Maldives. Similar to the 2008 election, this year’s election is very much a choice between democracy and autocracy.

[1] Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Comparative Politics 2 (3): 337-363. See also Shin, Doh Cull. 1994. On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research. World Politics 47 (1):135-170.

[2] Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

[3] Shaheed, Ahmed, and Jonathan Upton. 2008. “Maldives: Reform Deffered? Challenges and Lost Opportunities for Democratic Transition.” Center For The Study Of Islam and Democracy. Available: https://www.csidonline.org/9th_annual_conf/Shaheed_Upton_CSID_paper.pdf [Accessed: 17 April 2013]

[4] Bonofer, Jacob Ashik. 2010. The Challenges of Democracy in Maldives. International Journal of South Asian Studies 3 (2): 433-49.

[5] Shaheed, Ahmed, and Jonathan Upton. 2008. “Maldives: Reform Deffered? Challenges and Lost Opportunities for Democratic Transition.” Center For The Study Of Islam and Democracy. Available: https://www.csidonline.org/9th_annual_conf/Shaheed_Upton_CSID_paper.pdf [Accessed: 17 April 2013]

[6] ibid.

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About the author: Ahmed Hamdhan is a third-year Bachelor of Arts (Policy Studies and Political Science) student at the Australian National University. All comments represents the sole view of the author.